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Abstract  
The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) is a prominent theory of when current emotional 
state is expected to influence the interpretation of a social stimulus (situation). We 
discuss the assumptions in AIM and conclude that its current specification predicts 
that both deliberation time and situational complexity should lead to affect infusion. 
The aim of this research was to clarify the relative importance of these factors in 
determining affect infusion, and hence aid the further development of AIM. We 
present an experimental design in which situational complexity and deliberation time 
can be manipulated orthogonally as independent factors. Our results show that it is the 
latter factor, but not the former, which can influence the degree of affect infusion.  
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Cognitive theory, despite its sophistication, has been somewhat lacking when it comes 
to considering the role of emotion in behavior. From a practical point of view, this is 
an important shortcoming, as, for example, Razran (1940) illustrated in his pioneering 
study: Razran showed that a happy audience was more likely to welcome socio-
political messages, than an unhappy one.  
Much research highlights the importance of an expectation of positive affect in 
decision making. For example, Mellers and McGraw (2001) found that anticipatory 
pleasure often influenced the choices of their participants. Damasio (1994) suggested 
that perceptual representations can be linked with any relevant emotional experiences. 
This can help in decision making situations, by eliminating possibilities which are 
associated with negative emotions. In Peters’ et al. (2006) overview, there are some 
similar ideas, including the role of affect as a ‘common currency’ to evaluate 
disparate possibilities and the motivating role of affect (in terms of attaining positive 
emotions). Also, in psychopathology, there is an extensive literature on how 
personally relevant stimuli can capture observers’ attention (e.g., Cox, Fadardi & 
Pothos, 2006).  
Without doubt, affect is an important component of utility in decision making. 
But, one can also ask whether information regarding the current emotional state of an 
observer can interfere with cognitive processing in a way that does not relate to the 
utility of expected affect. In particular, we can formulate two general questions. First, 
what is the nature of the interaction between emotion and (the rest of) cognition and 
second when is it more likely that the current emotional state will affect a cognitive 
process. A theory which is particularly well-suited to tackle these problems is 
Forgas’s (1995a) Affect Infusion Model (AIM), an extensively researched and 
supported model for how emotion and cognition interact. The AIM is innovative in 
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that it enables predictions of when affect infusion should occur within a principled 
framework for various mechanisms of decision making. The focus of this work is 
AIM. We first summarize the main assumptions of AIM and subsequently proceed to 
motivate the examination of a particular prediction of the theory.  
 According to AIM, when interpreting a novel social situation, affect infusion 
is defined to occur when our current emotional state leads to an interpretation of the 
situation specifically congruent with this emotional state (cf. Bower, 1981; Forgas, 
1995a; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). For example, consider a scene of a man 
and a woman talking to each other, such that there are no cues as to whether this is a 
happy/excited interaction or an unhappy/angry one. Affect infusion would occur if 
people in (say) an unhappy mood would be more likely to offer unhappy 
interpretations—this is the basis of our experimental investigation.  
Forgas (1995a) proposed that there are four relevant (i.e., when it comes to 
considering possible interactions between cognition and emotion) modes of cognitive 
processing; knowing which mode of cognitive processing applies in a given situation 
can help predict whether affect infusion will occur or not (Figure 1). First, a person 
can access information about a belief already held; in such cases, an emotional 
valence may already be attached to a belief and therefore there would be little scope 
for the current emotional state to affect perception of the belief (this mode is referred 
to as ‘direct access’). For example, the attitude towards environmental issues of a 
committed environmentalist will not be affected by her current state of mind. Second, 
there are situations where information processing takes place in order to accomplish a 
specific goal, and so an effort would be made to specifically suppress potential 
emotional influences (this is the ‘motivated processing’ mode). For example, a person 
in an interview would do his best not to let his current emotional state affect his 
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performance. Third, we sometimes reach decisions not on the basis of any thorough 
consideration or examination of alternative possibilities, but rather relying on 
intuition, first impressions, or gut feeling (this is the ‘heuristic’ mode). The current 
emotional state can influence such decisions, as the non-emotional foundation of the 
decisions is weak (cf. theories considering affect as an additional source of 
information, e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Finally, making a social judgment can 
involve a substantive, generative process, in cases where unfamiliar information is 
encountered. For example, a novel social stimulus will have to be interpreted possibly 
by requiring access to personally relevant information. Personally relevant 
information is often encoded on the basis of emotional valence (as well as other 
information), therefore, current emotional state may, e.g., prime access to certain 
memories as opposed to others (this mode is called ‘substantive’ processing; cf. 
Kunda, 1990). An example of this is the finding of Bower (1981; Isen, 1984), who 
showed that participants in an unhappy mood are more likely to recall unhappy 
episodes etc.  
The third and fourth modes of cognitive processing are considered 
‘constructive’, in the sense that a person’s reliance on existing knowledge 
representations, e.g., for understanding a novel social situation, is limited; therefore, 
novel representations have to be constructed from the combination of stored 
information and new stimulus details (Fiedler, 1991; Forgas, 1992, 1995b).  
----------------------------Figure 1 about here--------------------------- 
The focus of the present work is the role of deliberation time and situational 
complexity in the likelihood of affect infusion. By deliberation time, we mean the 
amount of time devoted to interpreting a novel social stimulus. By situational 
complexity (or situational information), we mean the amount of information available 
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for a novel social stimulus. It is interesting to consider these two factors concurrently 
because they are related (e.g., we may devote more time in interpreting a more 
complex situation), but in principle, and in many practical situations, are independent. 
For example, we often have to consider complex problems under time pressure and, 
conversely, sometimes we have too much time to resolve a relatively uninvolved 
dilemma. AIM predicts differential affect infusion across situations defined by both 
high/low deliberation time and high/low situational complexity.  
According to the third suggested cognitive mode, affect infusion is more likely 
to occur when cognitive processing is heuristic. In heuristic processing, we seek to 
derive a conclusion fast and, therefore, we are more likely to rely on our current 
emotional state as a decision-making guide. In such cases, the less the available time, 
the more pressure there would be to reach a decision quickly and, therefore, the more 
we expect heuristic processing to occur (cf. Gigerenzer, 1996). Such a perspective is 
consistent with theories of affect infusion which posit that affect can be considered an 
extra source of information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), as well, of course, as being 
part of AIM. Note that whether affect is a valid source of information in interpreting 
the social scene or not will depend on the context. For example, if a person A is trying 
to interpret a social interaction between persons B and C and all three persons A, B, C 
are in the same or similar situation, then the current emotional state of person A will 
probably be a valid cue for the interpretation of the interaction between B and C. 
According to the fourth cognitive mode, substantive processing, substantial 
transformations/ generative elaboration of the stimulus of interest, are likely to 
encourage affect infusion. For example, for a person to interpret an ambiguous 
interaction between a man and a woman such that there are no cues as to whether this 
is a happy/excited interaction or an unhappy/angry on, it seems inevitable that the 
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person will have to ‘transform’ this novel social stimulus to a more interpretable form, 
with the aid of corresponding personal experiences (e.g., the person could remember 
similar interactions he/she may have had with the opposite gender; cf. Bower, 1981; 
Bower & Forgas, 2001). This leads to the prediction that the less the situation 
complexity, the longer the generative process which will be required to interpret the 
novel stimulus, and the more we expect substantive processing to occur.  
Thus, the current specification of the AIM architecture predicts that both 
deliberation time and situational complexity, in principle, predict affect infusion. 
Whether these factors are equally important in determining affect infusion, or whether 
one might be dominant relative to the other, is clearly a key empirical issue, which 
can further inform the AIM and influence its future revisions. The purpose of the 
present research is to factorially manipulate the two factors within the same 
experimental design and so settle this issue. 
Existing empirical evidence cannot help us clarify the problem of the relative 
importance between situational complexity and deliberation time. Cognitive load has 
been manipulated primarily in terms of tasks which compete for resources with the 
decision making task of interest. Under conditions of high cognitive load and time 
pressure, the general finding is increased affect infusion (e.g., Forgas, 1993, 1994; 
Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; 2002; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). Noda, Takai, and 
Yoshida (2007; cf. Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998) manipulated information content, but 
in terms of whether the information provided for a situation was complete or 
incomplete. When participants had limited time to respond, more affect infusion was 
observed in the incomplete condition, compared to the complete one. Noda et al. 
interpreted these results as showing that mood can be a source of information when 
inferring missing facts in the incomplete condition, under reduced cognitive capacity. 
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All the above results are suggestive of the relevance of the proposed 
manipulation, while not quite clarifying it. For example, greater informational 
complexity could correspond to higher cognitive load, but it is not clear whether it 
would lead participants to rely more on their mood as a decision making shortcut, or 
whether it would make them engage in more analytic, motivated processing, which 
should not be associated with affect infusion. Likewise, following Noda et al., under 
conditions of low informational complexity, we might predict that participants will 
use mood to ‘make up’ for the missing information. However, in Noda et al.’s study, 
the presented information was relevant, whereas in the proposed manipulation all 
information is basically irrelevant. In other words, in the incomplete condition in 
Noda et al.’s experiment, affect infusion was encouraged, because current emotional 
state could be used to infer the missing information; the design of Noda et al.’s 
experiment was such that low complexity implicated affect infusion. Suppose, 
however, that the design of the task is such that low (or high) situational complexity 
does not specifically bias towards affect infusion. Under such circumstances, does low 
(or high) situational complexity lead to greater affect infusion? This is the key 
consideration which motivated our design: in our high informational complexity 
condition, participants do have more facts about the situation they have to interpret, 
but these facts cannot be used as a guide regarding the interpretation of the emotional 
valence of the situation.  
In sum, while the issues of time pressure and cognitive load have been a focus 
of extensive research in affect infusion, there are no results relevant to considering 
informational complexity as such. As discussed above, informational complexity is 
(in principle, at least) an important factor in determining affect infusion, hence its 
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examination will allow more confidence both in interpreting the previous empirical 
results and the development of corresponding theory (such as AIM).  
 
Experimental Investigation 
Design & Participants 
A 2 x 2 x 2 design was utilized, with mood induction (positive vs. negative), 
deliberation time (brief vs. prolonged) and situation complexity (less complex vs. 
more complex) as between-participant factors. Participants were 122 Swansea 
University students, who either volunteered to take part or took part for course credit. 
Participants were randomly allocated to each of the eight conditions.  
 Because of the mood induction procedure, ethical considerations dictated that 
any participants displaying symptoms of depression or anxiety had to be excluded 
from the study. For depression, we employed the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), eliminating participants with a BDI score of 10 or 
higher. Five participants were excluded, leaving us with a sample of 117 (M= 2.83; 40 
males, 77 females, mean age: 23.21). For anxiety, we employed the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberg, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), trait version, 
eliminating participants with a score of 40 or higher (no participants were eliminated, 
M=28).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were first asked to complete the BDI and STAI questionnaires. They were 
subsequently given a distractor task to perform, while the experimenter was 
computing their BDI and STAI scores. The distractor task had the additional objective 
of inducing a fairly neutral mood to participants. The mood induction procedure 
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followed and then participants watched a brief animation (20 seconds) of a social 
situation. The main experimental task was next, whereby participants were asked to 
interpret the animation, either on the basis of little situational information (less 
complex condition) or high situational information (more complex condition). They 
had either a brief period of time to do this (brief condition) or a lot of time (prolonged 
condition; more details will be provided shortly). Finally, they received mood 
assessment measures (a self-report measure and a mood rating Likert scale) to 
examine their mood after the experimental task and confirm that it was broadly 
consistent with the one intended from the mood induction procedure.  
 The distractor task consisted of reading a brief review of a book by Maggie 
Campbell-Culver, ‘A Passion for Trees: The Legacy of John Evelyn’, from the 
Guardian newspaper (17th June 2006, reviewed by Andrea Wulf). The review was 
independently considered neutral by the authors of the study.  
 For the mood induction procedure, participants were asked to write about an 
emotionally charged personal experience (positive or negative), on a blank A4 sheet, 
in their own time (no time limit was specified; Brewer, Doughtie and Lubin,1980; 
Pham, 1998). They were told to emphasize their actual emotions relating to the 
experience, less so the non-emotional details of the experience. On average, 
participants took approximately 10 minutes to complete this task. An advantage of 
this method is that prompting participants to report their own personal experience 
overcomes the potential confounding effects of the content of the affect-inducing 
event.   
 We commissioned the development of a brief animation, which was designed 
to depict an ambiguous social situation. The animation showed two adults, a male and 
a female, in conversation. The animated characters were of average physical build and 
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height, dressed in non-specific everyday clothing, and of indistinct ethnic orientation. 
The characters were facing away from the observer so that no facial expressions or 
physical attractiveness were observable. The setting was non-descriptive (the man and 
the woman were simply placed in a gray background), so as not to give any hints 
about location and hence the content of the exchange between the man and the 
woman. The positioning of the characters and the way they gesticulated indicated that 
they were in conversation. The animation lasted for 20 seconds and was presented on 
an IBM-compatible personal computer. Figure 2 shows two frames from the 
animation.  
The ambiguousness of the situation was confirmed through a pilot study, 
whereby the animation was shown to 15 participants (other than the 122 recruited for 
the main part of the study). The pilot study participants simply saw the animation and 
were asked to decide what the man and the woman were doing (the response sheet 
was the same as the one in the less complex condition, see later). Positive and 
negative interpretations were nearly equal.  
-----------------------------Figure 2 about here---------------------------- 
 For the main experimental task, each participant received a sheet with 
information about the characters in the animation, organized into categories. 
Participants were asked to select the statement in each category which they believed 
was most accurate. In the simple condition, there were four categories of statements 
labeled Person A (a category of possibilities for what person A might be like; e.g., ‘is 
physically active; two statements), Person B (two statements), Setting (a category of 
possibilities for where person A and person B might be at the time of talking to each 
other; two statements), and Action (three statements). The Action category is the key 
category from which the dependent variable is derived. The Action category had three 
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statements which described possibilities for the interaction between person A and 
person B. There was a statement corresponding to a positive interaction (an excited 
conversation about a forthcoming event), one to a negative interaction (a heated 
conversation about a disagreement), and one to a neutral interaction (having a 
conversation admiring the landscape). Accordingly, the choice a participant made for 
the Action category would readily indicate whether the participant interpreted the 
interaction as a positive, neutral, or negative one.  
The situational complexity manipulation was implemented in two ways. First, 
we varied the number of categories of statements: few categories (four) vs. many 
categories (five). In the more complex condition, there was an extra category, 
background, which included six statements of the possible relation between the man 
and the woman (e.g., married). Second, we varied the number of alternative 
statements in each category. The four categories of the simple condition were 
supplemented with extra statements, so that each category had six to eight statements. 
The critical Action category in the more complex condition had six statements, so that 
there was a choice between two positive events (‘excited conversation about a 
forthcoming event’, ‘have just received some good news’), two negative events 
(‘heated conversation about a disagreement’, ‘have just received some bad news’) or 
two neutral events (‘conversation about a new film due out in the cinema’, 
‘conversation about the weather forecast for the holidays’).  
We reasoned that the more the categories and the more the alternative 
statements per category, the more the available potentially relevant information for 
the social situation and, hence, the greater the situational complexity of the novel 
social stimulus. Note, also, that the alternatives in the critical Action category in the 
more complex condition include all the alternatives in the simple condition and some 
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additional alternatives, which are directly analogous to the ones in the simple 
condition.  That is, the alternatives in both the simple and the complex condition 
corresponded to a positive, neutral, or negative interaction between person A and 
person B, but in the complex condition there are, e.g., two possibilities for a positive 
interpretation, instead of the one in the simple condition. 
The deliberation time manipulation was implemented by allowing 30 seconds 
to participants in the brief condition to complete the decision task, while in the 
prolonged condition they had three minutes. Note that 30 seconds are more than 
enough for participants to go through the statements and indicate responses, assuming 
average reading competence. As all our participants were at least undergraduate 
students in a higher education institution, there were no concerns regarding their 
reading competence. Also, we did not include a measure of whether in the three-
minute condition participants did employ all available time to consider the relevant 
information (some candidate such measures we considered would have confounded 
the manipulation).  
 After participants had selected the statements interpreting the animation clip, 
they carried out a brief mood assessment task. Mood assessment was not performed 
directly following the mood induction, out of concern that the manipulation check 
would reduce the effects of the mood induction (Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993) 
and arouse suspicion about the experiment's purpose. As well, we were interested in 
mood effects that were sufficiently long-lived to affect the experimental task. 
Accordingly, after the experimental task, participants received a seven point Likert 
scale in which one represented unhappy/sad mood and seven represented good/happy 
mood. Participants were instructed to circle the number which most represented their 
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mood at the present time. Also, they were asked to report their current mood by 
writing a few sentences, in their own words, to describe how they felt at the time.  
 
Results 
For the mood induction task, in general, participants wrote relatively long (2-3 pages) 
and detailed accounts of emotional personal events. Representative topics included 
romantic involvement, academic success, and the birth of a child (i.e., happiness), in 
addition to family breakdown, tragic accidents and the untimely death of a loved one 
(i.e., sadness). Likert scale ratings for participants who described a positive life event 
were higher (better mood) than Likert scale ratings for participants who described a 
negative life event (M = 5.25 vs. M = 3.56), t (115) = 8.32, p < .0005). The mood self-
reports were generally straightforward to interpret and were classified as indicating 
good mood, neutral, or bad mood. Accordingly, the mood self-report led to a three-
level ordinal mood variable. This variable correlated highly with the Likert scale 
results (r = .68, p<.0005). These results demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the 
mood manipulation. Given the consistency between the self reports and the Likert 
scale results, we decided to employ only the latter in subsequent analyses (since the 
Likert scale results are more detailed). Finally, we examined possible effects of age or 
gender on this mood measure, but there were no significant associations (for age: r = 
.13ns; for gender: r = -.06ns).  
Previous research has shown that the emotional valence of choices is often 
congruent with current mood (e.g., Razran, 1940). Our results are consistent with this 
finding: A one-way ANOVA with the emotional valence of choice (positive, neutral, 
negative) as the independent variable and the ratings on the mood Likert scale as the 
dependent variable, was highly significant (F(2,114)=50.72, p<.0005; all differences 
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in the predicted direction). Our objective in the rest of the analyses is to examine 
whether it is the time manipulation or the complexity one which led to greater affect 
infusion, and so clarify the AIM. We present three analyses, each having different 
strengths and weaknesses, which converge to the same conclusions.  
 We computed a mood congruency variable, which indicates the extent to 
which interpretation of the animation was consistent with participants’ mood. The 
mood congruency variable was a binary variable (congruent, incongruent), computed 
by combining the mood Likert scores and the emotional valence of the interpretation 
of the animation. For example, a low score on the mood Likert scale (indicating 
bad/unhappy mood) and an interpretation of the animation which carried a negative 
valence would be recorded as a ‘congruent’ choice. For mood ratings which indicated 
a neutral mood, a neutral interpretation was entered as mood congruent, whereas a 
positive, or negative interpretation, was entered as mood incongruent. Note that in the 
case of neutral mood we do not assume that a neutral mood would specifically lead to 
a choice of a neutral interpretation of the social interaction but, rather, to a choice of 
neither a positive nor a negative interpretation.  
 In the first kind of analysis, we examined the means for the four cells defined 
by the factorial combination of the time deliberation and situational complexity 
factors. We ran individual chi-square tests against the null hypothesis that there 
should be an equal proportion of mood congruent and mood incongruent responses in 
each cell (Table 1). The only condition in which the frequency of congruent responses 
is higher than what would be expected by chance is the one of low deliberation time 
and low situational information; in all the other cases we could not identify a 
difference in the frequencies of mood congruent and mood incongruent responses.  
 
15                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1. Mood congruency frequencies as a function of the experimental variables. 
Significance values for the chi-square tests are shown in boldface.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Experimental factors    Responses 
Time      Complexity   Mood congruent     Mood incongruent       Chi square, p  
High        High                                  10                               13                       0.391, .53 
Low         High                                  14                              11                       0.360, .55 
High         Low                                  16                              22                       0.947,  .33 
Low          Low                                 22                                9                        5.452,  .02 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The above analysis has only exploratory value, since we cannot be sure that 
the chance probability of a congruent response is the same as the chance probability 
of an incongruent response. In the second kind of analysis, we therefore ran a 
regression analysis with mood congruency (yes, no) as the dependent variable and 
deliberation time, situational complexity, participant mood (the Likert scale ratings), 
and gender as the independent variables (all possible two-way interaction terms were 
included as well). Participant mood was included as a predictor since it is possible that 
participants might be making more selections congruent with their mood if they were 
in an, e.g., positive mood. Note that as the self-reported mood variable was a 
continuous one (Likert scale ratings had a range of 1-7), an ANOVA could not have 
been employed. With this analysis we assume that it is more appropriate to use the 
reported mood ratings as an independent variable, rather than the induced mood 
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manipulation, since the mood manipulation may have been less effective for some 
participants. 
The full regression model was significant (F(9,107)=2.996, p=.003), however, 
most standardized beta coefficients were not significant, indicating that we had a case 
of colinearity. We therefore ran a reduced regression model without the interaction 
terms (there were six interaction terms in total). This reduced model was also 
significant: F(4,112)=4.145, p=.004. In fact, the more elaborate model was not 
significantly better than the reduced model (F(5,106)=1.910, p=0.098), so casting 
doubt on the importance of the interaction terms. Crucially, the reduced model allows 
us to compare the importance of situational information and deliberation time. The 
standardized beta for situational complexity was 0.081 and for deliberation time 0.259 
(only the latter was significantly different from zero, p=.005), indicating that between 
the two factors, it is clearly deliberation time that is more important in determining 
affect infusion. Note that the standardized beta coefficient for gender was very high as 
well (-0.268, p=.003) 
In the second kind of analysis we assumed that the self-reported mood (the 
Likert scale ratings) is the valid independent variable with regards to the current 
emotional state of the participants. However, self-reported mood may be subject to 
confounds, such as relating to personal traits (we thank Rolf Reber for this 
observation). In the third kind of analysis, we therefore ran a 2x2x2x2 factorial 
ANOVA with mood congruency as the dependent variable (yes, no), and deliberation 
time, situational information, mood induction procedure (positive or negative), and 
gender as independent variables. As with the regression analysis, the only significant 
main effects were the main effect of deliberation time (F(1,101)=4.129, p=.045) and 
the main effect of gender (F(1,101)=8.595, p=.004). No two-way interactions were 
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significant, consistently with the finding from the regression analysis. Note that short 
deliberation time led to more mood congruent responses (mean 0.64) than long 
deliberation time (mean 0.43), as expected from Table 1. Also, more mood-congruent 
selections were observed for females (0.61) than for males (0.38).  
 
Discussion 
Understanding when emotion can influence a cognitive process is important both from 
a practical and theoretical point of view. According to an important theory for affect 
infusion, the AIM (Forgas, 1995a), one possibility is that affect infusion occurs when 
there is heuristic processing. Heuristic processing can occur when there is less 
available deliberation time. Another possibility is that affect infusion occurs when 
there is substantive processing. Substantive (generative) processing could occur when 
there is less information available about a novel stimulus (less situational 
information). Are deliberation time and situational complexity equally important in 
determining affect infusion? The current specification of AIM would lead us to expect 
so, but this may not be the case. We factorially manipulated situational information 
and deliberation time and found only deliberation time to influence affect infusion, 
not situational information (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 1990; 2000). 
 Is it also possible to conclude that it is heuristic processing which primarily 
leads to affect infusion, and not substantive processing? There is some preliminary 
indication that this is the case, because the chi-squared analysis showed the low 
deliberation time and low situational information condition to be associated with the 
highest affect infusion. In that condition, we can speculate that participants did not 
have enough time to engage in substantive processing, so that heuristic processing 
was the preferred mode of responding. By contrast, there was no evidence of affect 
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infusion in the high deliberation time, low situational information condition, which we 
would expect to be associated with substantive/generative processing in our 
experiment. Promising as this line of reasoning appears, we hasten to add that without 
independent evidence that heuristic/ substantive processing did or did not occur, it is 
impossible to verify the above claims; this is an issue which we hope to address in 
future work.  
Methodologically, there are several possibilities for improving the current 
study. For example, deliberation time could be manipulated more exhaustively, rather 
than being limited to two conditions, or involve the inclusion of alternative cognitive 
load manipulations (Maule and Hockey, 1993). A similar problem arises for the 
manipulation of situational information. We assumed that complexity could be 
operationalized in terms of the number of categories of information relating to the 
social situation and also the number of alternative statements. Both these 
manipulations could be thought of as impacting on the complexity of the situation 
because they influence the demands on working memory (a task which increases 
working memory can be considered a more difficult task). Is there a sufficiently large 
difference in working memory demands between the simple and complex condition? 
It is hard to provide an exact figure for this difference because we do not know how 
much of the available information participants concurrently considered (in making 
their selections). However, a reasonable estimate can be provided as follows. First, in 
the complex condition there was one more category of statements than in the simple 
condition. Assuming that participants did not make their selection for each response 
category independently of the others, this would imply more working memory load 
throughout the task. Second, in the complex condition, for each response category, 
there were three to six extra statements, compared to the simple condition. This 
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difference corresponds well to estimates of the capacity of working memory (e.g., 
Cowan, 2001).  
Our justification for the complexity manipulations can be undermined by two 
criticisms. First, why not include more statements per response category and more 
response categories in the complex condition so as to make the difference between the 
simple and the complex condition more pronounced? The answer here was that we 
wanted to factorially manipulate deliberation time and situational complexity. 
Therefore, the high complexity condition was constrained to include as much 
information as would be possible to process even in the low deliberation time 
condition. Second, what about alternative complexity manipulations, for example, as 
might be forthcoming from the logical complexity of a situation (cf. Braine et al., 
1995; Johnson-Laird, 1994)? Such an approach may well lead to different results from 
those we obtained presently and it would be a worthwhile endeavor to pursue it in the 
future.  
Turning to other potential problems, some participants reported having made a 
preliminary judgment regarding the interpretation of the animation, before they were 
given the information. It would be desirable to try to prevent such preliminary 
judgments in future replications. Another tricky issue relates to the way the emotional 
valence of the interpretation of the situation was assessed. We employed a structured 
set of alternatives, so that some alternatives corresponded to a clearly positive 
interpretation, others to a negative one, etc. Another approach would have been to 
allow participants an unconstrained response mode in interpreting the social situation. 
We were reluctant to adopt this alternative method, since it might have led to 
emotionally ambiguous responses.  
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The objective of this project was to provide results which will help the further 
development of the AIM theory. Our key result, that deliberation time impacts on 
affect infusion, but not situational information, suggests ways in which the 
specification of AIM could be constrained. For example, the AIM mechanisms for 
affect infusion which depend on situational complexity could be revised. AIM 
currently predicts that less available information would lead to more generative 
processing, which may in turn be subject to more affect infusion. However, maybe the 
critical factor in this mechanism is not the extent of available information but rather 
the length of deliberation time. It is possible that with a short deliberation time 
attention can be focused on the specific information relevant to a problem, but as 
deliberation time increases the focus of attention becomes less sharp and encompasses 
potentially less relevant information (such as the current emotional state). A study 
specifically manipulating deliberation time against the extent of generative processes 
should clarify this possibility.  
Another issue worth considering relates to more practical aspects of AIM. This 
study highlighted the difficulty in identifying the specific mechanism via which 
participants made their selections. Developing behavioral markers of, e.g., heuristic 
vs. generative processing of a problem would clearly greatly help further test and 
elaborate the theory. Finally, theoretically, there is a separate literature on how affect 
could be influenced by purely cognitive processing considerations, such as perceptual 
fluency (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). In our experiments perceptual 
fluency was not manipulated, although situations of low situational information could 
be considered broadly analogous to situations of high perceptual fluency. It is not 
clear whether perceptual fluency can be integrated within AIM, but this is certainly an 
intriguing possibility for future work.    
21                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
 Acknowledgements  
This research was partly supported by ESRC grant R000222655 and EC Framework 6 
grant contract 516542 (NEST) to the second author. We are grateful to Neil Goss for 
creating the animation. We would also like to thank Rolf Reber, Dawn Macauley, and 
one other anonymous reviewer for many helpful comments on the manuscript.  
 
References  
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Beck Depression Inventory manual 
(2nd Ed.). San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148.  
Bower, G. H.  & Forgas, J. P. (2001). Affect, memory and social cognition. In E. Eich 
(Ed.) Counterpoints: Cognition and Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Braine, M. D. S.., O'Brien, D. P., Noveck, I. A., Samuels, M. C., Lea, B. L., Fisch, S. 
M., Yang Y. (1995), Predicting Intermediate and Multiple Conclusions in 
Propositional Logic Inference Problems: Further Evidence for a Mental Logic, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 263-292. 
Brewer, D., Doughtie, E. B. & Lubin, B. (1980). Induction of mood and mood shift. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36, 215-226. 
Cox, W. M., Fadardi, J. S., & Pothos, E. M. (2006). The addiction-Stroop test: 
Theoretical considerations and procedural recommendations. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 443-476. 
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-185. 
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New 
York: Avon Books.  
22                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
Fiedler, K. (1991). On the task, the measures and the mood in research on affect and 
social cognition. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp. 83 - 
104). Oxford: Pergamon. 
Forgas, J. P. (1992b). On bad mood and peculiar people: Affect and person typicality 
in impression formation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 863-
875. 
Forgas, J. P. (1993). On making sense of odd couples: mood effects on the perception 
of mismatched relationships. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 
59-71.  
Forgas, J. P. (1994). Sad or guilty? Affective influences on the explanation of conflict 
episodes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 1-24.  
Forgas, J. P. (1995a). Mood and judgments: The affect infusion model (AIM). 
Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39-66. 
Forgas, J. P. (1995b). Strange couples: Mood effects on judgments and memory about 
prototypical and atypical targets. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
21, 747-765. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded 
rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669. 
Isen, A. M., Shalker, T. E., Clark, M. & Karp, L. (1978). Affect, accessibility of 
material in memory and behaviour: a cognitive loop? Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 36, 1-12.  
Isen, A. M. (1984). Towards Understanding the Role of Affect in Cognition. 
Handbook of Social Cognition. Wyer, R. S. & Srull, T. K. (Eds.). Erlbaum: 
Hillsdale, NJ. (3), pp. 179-236. 
23                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1994). Mental models and probabilistic thinking. Cognition, 50, 
189-209. 
Keltner, D., Locke, K. D. & Audrain, P. C. (1993). The influence of attributions on 
the relevance of negative feelings to personal satisfaction. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 19, 21–19. 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 
480-498. 
Maule, J. & Hockey, G. R. J. (1993) State, stress and time pressure. In O. Svenson & 
J. Maule (Eds.) Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision 
Making. New York: Plenum. 
Mellers, B. A. & McGraw, P. (2001). Anticipated emotions as guides to choice. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 210-214. 
Noda, M., Takai, J., & Yoshida, T. (2007). The Influence of Time Pressure on Mood-
Congruent Effects: Evaluating Products With Limited Information. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology,  37,  403–425. 
Peters, E., Vaestfjaell, D., Gaerling, T., & Slovic, P. (2006). Affect and decision 
making: A “hot” topic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 79-85. 
Pham, M. T. (1998). Representativeness, relevance, and the use of feelings in decision 
making. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 144-159.  
Razran, G. H. S. (1940). Conditioned response changes in rating and appraising socio-
political slogans. Psychological Bulletin, 37, 481-493.   
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing fluency and aesthetic 
pleasure: is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 8, 364-382. 
24                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
Sanbonmatsu, D. M. & Fazio, R. H. (1990). The role of attitudes in memory-based 
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.  59.  614-22. 
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational 
functions of affective states. In Higgins, E. T., & Sorrentino, R. M. (Eds.) 
Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behaviour (Vol. 
2). New York: Guilford. 
Schwarz, N. (2000). Agenda 2000: Attitudes and social judgment - warmer, more 
social, and less conscious. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 149–176. 
Schwarz, N. & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgment of well-
being: informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523. 
Shiv, B. & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and mind in conflict: the interplay of affect 
and cognition in consumer decision making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26, 
278–292. 
Shiv, B. & Fedorikhin, A. (2002). Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of 
Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behaviour.  Organizational Behaviour and 
Human Decision Processes, 87, 342-370. 
Siemer, N. & Reisenzein, R. (1998). Effect of mood on evaluative judgment: 
Influence of reduced processing capacity and mood salience. Cognition and 
Emotion, 12, 738-805. 
Spielberg, C., Gorsuch, R. L. & Lushene, R. E. (1970). The state–trait anxiety 
inventory, Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scale. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070: 
25                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
 
26                                                                                  complexity vs. time 
 
 
Figure captions.  
 
Figure 1. A schematic outline of AIM. 
 
Figure 2. Two frames from a 20s animation, depicting an ambiguous social situation.  
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